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FEATURE

ARTICLE

Playing with Fire: Assessing Lighter Manufacturers'
Duties Regarding Child Play Lighter Fires
by Thomas M. Peters and Hal 0. Carroll
I.

INTRODUCTION

like a sharp knife, exhibits both an obvious
Disposable gas-fueled lighters offer consum- hazard and a usefulness inseparable from that
ers greater convenience and probably greater
hazard. The interplay of these three principles
in child lighter fire cases has created some
safety than matches. Lighters are more convenient than matches because they last longer
difficulties for courts regarding each of the two
than a book of matches and can be operated
main duties associated with product liability
with one hand. Since a dropped lighter extinlaw - the duty to warn of possible hazards
guishes itself, while a dropped match continues and the duty to design and manufacture prodto burn, a lighter may be a safer product.
ucts that are not "unreasonably dangerous."
However, like many other products, lighters
This article analyzes how courts and legislacan cause injury if they are defective, such as
tures have applied their states' product liability
when the plastic back cracks or the gas does
law in child lighter fire cases. The article
not shut off. With respect to defects, lighters
focuses on the way courts alter traditional
are no different from other products, so the
product liability concepts in resolving child
standard product liability laws apply.
lighter fire cases. First, the article introduces
What differentiates lighters from many other some basic product liability concepts. Second,
products, however, is their potentially dangerthe article addresses manufacturers' duty to
ous use by children. Even a defect-free lighter, warn adults and children about the dangers of
which functions as intended in the hands of an
child lighter fires. This section explains how
adult, can cause serious harm when activated
courts apply the "open and obvious" and "adult
by a child. For example, one source estimated
product" doctrines in determining whether to
that children under age 5 cause 5,800 residenimpose a duty upon manufacturers to warn of
tial fires, 170 deaths, and 1,190 injuries each
the dangers created by using a lighter. Next,
year by playing with lighters.' Additionally,
the article details the different approaches used
the estimated amount of damage caused by
by several states to outline manufacturers' duty
child lighter fires ranges from $300-375
to childproof lighters. This section analyzes the
million annually, and "dollar for dollar, these
different theories underlying design liability in
various states and the ways that courts interpret
lighters are involved in causing almost as
much damage through childplay as they gener- and apply statutory language defining this
ate in sales at the retail level."2
Three fundamental principles
of law and public policy emerge
ThEomas M. Peters is a shareholderin the
in these cases. First, a product
Detroit firm of Vandeveer Garzia, PC.He
that performs as designed is not
practiices in the area of product
liability,
defective, and therefore gives
inclu6ring cases involving butane-fueled
rise to no liability. Second,
society, recognizing the limitalighters and child resistance and child
tions of small children, expects
guard'ing issues.
adults to ensure children's
safety. Finally, a lighter is a
Ha10. Carrollis head of the firm's appellate
simple tool, and a simple tool,
,4onr
"tment.
1997

Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 339

M

__

duty. Finally, the article describes the riskutility analysis employed by some courts to
balance the benefits offered by lighters against
the risks they present. In this section, the
author describes the factors courts examine in
applying the analysis, and the author suggests
other factors that should be included in courts'
analyses.
II.

BACKGROUND

Different states formulate product liability
law in different ways. In some states, courts
have taken the lead in developing the law3
while legislatures have assumed this role in
other states.4 Regardless of whether a state's
product liability law is created by a legislature
or a court system, different states adopt different legal theories underlying products liability.
Several states utilize a strict liability scheme to
define manufacturers' duties and to assess
liability.' By contrast, other states rely on a
traditional negligence theory to accomplish
these goals.6 Furthermore, in other states,
consumer expectations form the foundation of
product liability law.7
Underlying all of these theories is a fundamentally basic concept: the concept of "riskutility" analysis. This concept involves balancing the risks a product poses against its benefits (otherwise known as its "utility"). Courts
usually perform the risk-utility analysis because they are responsible for deciding the
threshold question of whether a manufacturer
has a duty to warn and design reasonably safe
products.8 In many cases, the outcome of a
risk-utility analysis dictates whether a manufacturer has a particular duty. The standard
risk-utility analysis is complicated in child
lighter fire cases because these cases present
more intricate and more subtle "duty to warn"
issues than traditional product liability cases.
In addition, in child lighter fire cases, the adult
nature of the product and the varying abilities
of children further complicate the analysis.
Similarly, child lighter fire cases involve
design issues that differ from traditional
340 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

product liability cases because the lighters are
not defective when they injure a child or cause
property damage. Courts deciding these cases
do not complain, for example, that the lighter
failed to extinguish the flame when the user
released the lever, or that the lighter ruptured
and released butane. In child play lighter fire
cases, the lighter performs as designed - it
creates a flame - but causes injury because of
the person operating the product.
Since the sole purpose of a lighter is to make
a flame, the "open and obvious hazard" doctrine represents a common defense to product
liability lawsuits.9 Obviously, lighters create
flames. The real issue, however, is whether this
fact impacts a manufacturer's duty to warn or
to design a "safer," more child-resistant product. The sections below address both the duty
to warn and the duty to design safer lighters in
detail.
IH.

DO MANUFACTURERS OWE
CONSUMERS A DUTY TO WARN?

The basic question regarding "failure to
warn" liability is whether manufacturers have a
duty to warn consumers about the hazard of
fires caused by lighter use.' 0 In child lighter
fire cases, there are two specific issues: (1)
whether manufacturers have a duty to warn
adult purchasers of the hazards of child lighter
fires; 1 and (2) whether manufacturers have a
duty to warn children of the danger of lighter
fires. 12
When addressing a manufacturer's duty to
warn adults of the fire hazards associated with
adult use of lighters, courts have applied the
"open and obvious hazard" doctrine to negate
any duty to warn.' 3 Under this doctrine,
manufacturers have no duty to warn adults
because the hazard is obvious to the intended
user. 4 Similarly, some courts have been
unwilling to impose upon manufacturers a duty
to warn children. 5 Often these courts base
their decisions on one or both of two facts: (1)
the danger is open and obvious; and (2) the
lighter is an adult product. 16 For example, in
Volume 9, number 4
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Adams v. Perry FurnitureCo., the Court of
warnings are sufficient to warn adults of the
Appeals of Michigan determined that these two hazards of child lighter fires.22 For example, in
facts negated any duty to warn the child user of Curtis v. UniversalMatch Corp., the United
the danger of fires. 7 Rejecting the argument
States District Court for the Eastern District of
that this danger is not open and obvious to a
Tennessee stated that the warning" 'KEEP
child, the court stated that "the focus is the
OUT OF REACH OF CHILDREN' is suffitypical user's perception"'' 8 and "the typical
ciently calculated [as a matter of law] to notify
user of a lighter is an adult."' 9 The court added a reasonably prudent, ordinary consumer about
that warnings directed at children are of doubt- the nature and extent of the danger involved in
ful value: "To the extent that children cannot
leaving a lighter around unsupervised chilread any warning or understand the obvious
dren." 23
danger, we believe that a reasonably careful
Similarly, the Court of Appeals of Michigan
held that a lighter manufacturer "fulfills its
purchaser would keep
the lighter from these
duty to warn by
children." 0 Thus, the
warning the adult
court held that manupurchasers of its
facturers have no duty
If manufFa
products to keep
cturers have no
to warn adults or
the lighters out of
children of general fire
duty to warn adults of the fire
the reach of chilhazards associated with
dren."24 Although
2
lighter use. '
hazard resultJ ig from adult use
these courts held
If manufacturers
that the warnings
have no duty to warn
and no duty t 0 warn children of
were adequate as a
adults of the fire hazard
matter of law, the
resulting from adult use
the fire haza r(
d resulting from
courts' scrutiny of
and no duty to warn
the warnings seems
children of the fire
child use, th e next question is
to suggest that
hazard resulting from
manufacturers may
child use, the next
whether man facturers have a
have a duty to warn
question is whether
adults about the
manufacturers have a
duty to warn atdults about the fire dangers inherent in
duty to warn adults
children's use of
about the fire hazard
hazard createdt.when children use lighters.
created when children
use lighters.
li! ghters.
A.

The TraditionalApproach

Most courts have not relied on legal theory
or public policy in resolving the issue of
whether manufacturers have a duty to warn
adults about the hazard of child lighter fires.
Instead, these courts have resolved the issue by
considering the adequacy of the general warnings provided by manufacturers and by concluding, as a matter of law, that these general
1997

B.

Alabama Adopts a Different
Approach: Bean v. BIC Corp.

In addressing whether there is a duty to warn
adults about the danger of child lighter fires,
the Alabama Supreme Court reviewed the
warnings Tennessee and Michigan courts held
sufficient as a matter of law. The court found
that the adequacy of the warnings was not a
matter of law, but rather was a question of fact
Loyola University Chicago School of Law 9 341

duty would raise serious public policy confor the jury.25 In Bean v. BIC Corp., Plaintiffs
cerns because it would create an artificial
made three specific allegations about the
distinction between different simple tools,
warnings that were not raised in Michigan or
which are generally benign in the hands of an
Tennessee. First, Plaintiffs claimed that the
adult yet potentially dangerous when handled
manufacturer "failed to warn about the attrac26
by children. If the Bean argument was adopted,
tiveness of the lighters to small children.
lighter manufacturers would owe consumers a
Second, they argued that the manufacturer
duty to warn while knife manufacturers would
"failed to warn of the serious danger of fires
not. Given the common risk of child injury
started by small children."27 Third, they
with both of these simple tools, there is no
claimed that the manufacturer "failed to warn
principled basis for imposing liability for
that small children could easily operate the
lighters."28 The Bean court accepted Plaintiffs' failing to warn of a lighter's attractiveness to
argument that these were questions for the jury, children while declining to impose liability for
failure to warn of a knife's similar attractive
but did so essentially without discussion.29
quality.
Plaintiffs' first argument, the "attractiveThe second argument Plaintiffs raised in
ness" argument, is weak because Plaintiffs
Bean, the "serious danger" argument, is also
have either assumed that: (1) lighters are
unpersuasive. This argument implies that
unusually attractive to children and courts
whether a manufacturer has a duty to explicitly
should therefore impose liability; or, alternawarn adults about the danger posed by child
tively, (2) that courts should impose liability
lighter fires depends upon whether the danger
even though lighters are only as attractive as,
is actually associated with children playing
but no more attractive than, other household
objects. The assumption that children are more with lighters. This contention ignores the
universally recognized danger associated with
attracted to lighters than to other objects is an
playing with fire, whatever its source. Given
unsupported assumption at best. More importhe common knowledge of this danger, the
tantly, this assumption conflicts with the
dangers of a fire created by a lighter are apparcommon knowledge that small children exent to the intended user. Therefore, the open
plore the world by reaching for all objects.
and obvious hazard doctrine should preclude a
This knowledge is evidenced by the broad
court from imposing a duty to warn, 30 and
range of products which parents must keep
from small children, including such diverse
courts should not make a lighter
of basic fire
manufacturer's duty to warn
items as medicine, cleaning fluids, plastic
3
bags, knives, coins, and matches. Parents must dangers a question of fact. '
The strength of the third argument advanced
keep these items from small children because
in Bean, that children can operate lighters,
children may injure themselves playing or
experimenting with them. Because the assump- differs sharply from that of the first and second
contentions. This argument supports the claim
tion that lighters are unusually attractive to
that parents should be warned that "small
children defies common knowledge, it should
children could easily operate the lighters. 32
not support the conclusion that manufacturers
The Bean court's decision to submit this issue
have a duty to warn about the hazards of child
to a jury is more defensible than its decision to
lighter fires.
With this argument, Plaintiffs in Bean would submit Plaintiff's first two arguments to the
jury because this issue, unlike the other two,
have courts impose liability on lighter manufacturers for failing to warn adults that lighters raises questions of fact. Specifically, it raises
questions regarding the strength and dexterity
are attractive to children even though lighters
are no more attractive or dangerous than any of required to operate a lighter. Given these
questions of fact, the court submitted the duty
the objects mentioned above. Imposing this
342 * Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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issue to the jury rather than hold, as a matter of
law, that manufacturers have a duty to warn
consumers about the ease with which children
can operate lighters. 3 Although no other state
has specifically addressed this argument, the
tenor of the Tennessee and Michigan decisions
strongly suggests that they would reject it on
policy grounds. 34
Courts adopting the Bean approach would
force manufacturers to charge higher prices for
lighters. As a result, consumers would have to
pay more for lighters without a corresponding
increase in efficiency or performance. On the
other hand, consumers would benefit from
increased warnings in states which embrace the
Bean approach. In those states, manufacturers
may provide more specific warnings to minimize liability for failure to warn. This response
may lead to improved lighter safety for consumers. Of course, relative costs and benefits
would have to be weighed to determine the
ultimate outcome for consumers.
C.

CurrentStatus of the Law

In all jurisdictions, courts unanimously hold
that there is no duty to warn children of the
hazard of child lighter fires; therefore, manufacturers will usually escape liability on this
theory.3 5 In addition, except for Alabama,
courts either hold that there is no duty to warn
adult purchasers of the hazard of child fires,36
or that a simple "[k]eep out of reach of children" warning is sufficient. 37 Alabama stands
alone in permitting a failure to warn claim for
child lighter fire cases.38 To resolve the issue
of whether manufacturers have a duty to warn
adults, the overwhelming majority of state
courts employ conventional analyses based on
the obviousness of the hazard, the nature of the
lighter, and its function. 39 However, with
respect to the second duty of product liability,
the duty to design a reasonably safe product,
the law is not as consistent.

1997

DO MANUFACTURERS HAVE A
DUTY TO DESIGN
"CHILDPROOF" LIGHTERS?
The second unique legal problem created by
child play lighter fires is the issue of whether
manufacturers have a duty to design lighters
that are inoperable by most children, otherwise
known as the "design duty."'' The feasibility
of child-resistant lighters is supported by the
Consumer Product Safety Commission's
adoption of a child-resistance standard for
lighters.4 The standard requires that 85% of
the child test panel, comprised of children
under five years old, be unable to operate the
lighter.42 Arguably, reducing the percentage of
young children capable of operating a lighter
would result in a measurable societal safety
benefit with no corresponding decrease in
lighter utility. To date, however, this proposition has been neither confirmed nor disproved
by empirical data.
States have analyzed the design duty issue
differently because of the varied legal theories
underlying each state's product liability law.43
The three main types of product liability
theories currently embraced by states are: (1)
the consumer expectation theory; (2) the
negligence combined with strict liability
theory; and (3) the refusal to impose design
duty, even for foreseeable users. Despite the
differences between these legal theories, the
cases are surprisingly uniform in their results.' Specifically, courts appear reluctant to
hold manufacturers liable in child play lighter
fire cases for failing to design childproof
lighters because the lighters worked as intended by creating a flame.4 5 The uniformity in
the results suggests that the details of each
state's product liability theories are much less
important than the particular court's perception
of the underlying real-world facts relating to
the purpose of lighters and the concept of
parental responsibility.

Loyola University Chicago School of Law 9 343

A.

Consumer Expectation Theory

One theory employed by courts determining
a manufacturer's design duty is the "consumer
expectation" theory.' Under this theory, the
expectation of the "ordinary consumer" dictates whether a manufacturer has a design duty,
and thus, ultimately determines whether a
manufacturer will be liable for designing a
lighter that can be operated by children.47
1.

States Requiring Defective AND
Unreasonably Dangerous Products

Because Indiana's legislature statutorily
adopted the consumer expectation theory, an
examination of the relevant statute is beneficial. Indiana's product liability law provides in
pertinent part:
One who sells, leases, or otherwise
puts into the stream of commerce
any product in a defective condition
unreasonablydangerous to any user
or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability for physical harm
caused by that product to the consumer or to his property if that user
or consumer is in the class of persons
that the seller should reasonably
foresee as being subject to the harm
caused by the defective condition.48
This section of the Indiana statute defines
the class of potential plaintiffs as those whom a
seller should reasonably foresee as subject to
harm. Since children are a class of plaintiffs
which a seller could reasonably foresee as
subject to harm from lighters, the Indiana
statute may extend the manufacturer's design
duty to children. Furthermore, a product is
"defective" under Indiana law if it performs in
a way that is not contemplated by "expected
users." 49 The phrase "expected users" also
arguably encompasses the concept of foreseeable users - users who might plausibly
include children. However, Indiana's statutory
344 e Loyola Consumer Law Reporter

definition of an unreasonably dangerous
product 0 restricts the class of plaintiffs to
"ordinary consumers." The relevant section of
the Indiana statute provides: "a product is
unreasonably dangerous if it: exposes the user
or consumer to a risk of physical harm to an
extent beyond that contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it." 5'
In Welch v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., the Indiana
Court of Appeals applied this statutory scheme
in the context of child lighter fires. The Welch
court found that lighters are not unreasonably
dangerous because "[t]he ordinary consumer of
a lighter is an adult and the ordinary adult
consumer contemplates the risks posed by a
lighter, including the dangers associated with
children who play with lighters." 51 The court
explained that "regardless of foreseeability,
liability does not attach under the statute unless
the product in question is in a defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition."53 Accordingly, Indiana law imposes no duty on manufacturers to childproof lighters because these
products are not unreasonably dangerous to
ordinary consumers: adults.
2.

States Requiring Defective OR
Unreasonably Dangerous Products

Like Indiana, Tennessee defines product
liability by statute,' 4 and Tennessee also
distinguishes between "defective products" and
"unreasonably dangerous" products.5 Unlike
Indiana, which requires that a product be both
defective and unreasonably dangerous for a
design duty to be imposed, Tennessee's consumer expectation test requires that a plaintiff
prove that a lighter is either defective or
unreasonably dangerous in order for a design
duty to be imposed.56
Under Tennessee's consumer expectation
test, a "defective" product is one "unsafe for
normal or anticipatable handling and consumption. ' 57 Like Indiana's "expected users" concept, Tennessee's "anticipatable handling"
standard suggests that a manufacturer may owe
Volume 9, number 4
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a design duty to foreseeable users of its products. Furthermore, the Tennessee statute
defines an "unreasonably dangerous" product
as one that is:
dangerous to an extent beyond that
which would be contemplated by the
ordinary consumer who purchases it,
or a product [that] because of its
dangerous condition would not be
put on the market by a reasonably
prudent manufacturer or seller
assuming that [the manufacturer or
seller] knew of its dangerous condition.58
In determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous, Tennessee courts have held
that the "ordinary consumers" of lighters are
adults, not minor children.59
In Curtis v. Universal Match Corp., the
United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Tennessee applied Tennessee's
version of the consumer expectation test to a
child play lighter fire case. First, the Curtis
court held that the lighter was not defective
"because it performed in the manner expected.
..[It] produced a flame when operated which
conformed to its normal and anticipated use.'6°
Next, the court held that the lighter was not
unreasonably dangerous because the "ordinary
adult consumer" understood and appreciated
the danger posed by children's use of lighters. 61 By interpreting the statute's "ordinary
consumer" language as applying only to adult
consumers, the Curtis court implicitly rejected
the notion that lighter manufacturers owe all
foreseeable users a duty to design childproof
products. The court also emphasized that
Tennessee law does not require manufacturers
to design perfect or accident-proof products.62
Instead, manufacturers only have to design
products which are not defective or unreasonably dangerous to the ordinary adult user, as
described above.
In summary, as the Welch and Curtis decisions illustrate, courts applying the consumer
1997

expectation theory have limited the lighter
manufacturers' design duty to design lighters
for the intended users of the product: adults.
Although the relevant statutes suggest that the
Indiana and Tennessee legislatures may have
intended to protect foreseeable users of lighters, the courts have narrowed the potential
scope of these state statutes by construing the
protection of these laws to apply only to adult
users.
B.

Combining Negligence and Strict
Liability Theories

Product liability law in Pennsylvania applies
both a negligence standard - which traditionally extends manufacturers' design duty to all
foreseeable users - and a strict liability
standard. Courts applying this hybrid approach
in child fire cases have reached nontraditional
and unexpected results.
In Griggs v. BIC Corp.,63 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit noted
that the strict liability prong of the Pennsylvania analysis is based on Section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. 64 Section 402A
provides: "One who sells any product in a
defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer... [i]s subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property." 65
Based on this standard, Plaintiff in Griggs
argued that a lighter was unreasonably dangerous to foreseeable users, and thus defective,
because it was not childproof.6 The Third
Circuit rejected this contention, agreeing with
the district court that "a product may not be
deemed defective unless it is unreasonably
dangerous to intended users. 67 Specifically,
the court found that, under Pennsylvania law,
"foreseeability ...plays no part in the initial
68
determination of defect in strict liability.
Next, the court explained that "because children are not intended users, [the lighter manufacturer] is not strictly liable. ' 69 Thus, the
Griggs court's conclusion on the strict liability
portion of the analysis mirrored that reached
Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 345

by the Welch court.
However, the Griggs court reached the
opposite result under the negligence prong.
Since foreseeability forms the basis of negligence liability, manufacturers owe a duty to "a
different subset of the population, and one that
is conceivably broader: a duty to anyone who
foreseeably may be subject to an unreasonable
risk of harm."70 On this basis, the court applied
the risk-utility analysis and held that a viable
design liability claim could result from a
manufacturer's failure to make a lighter childresistant.7 ' Thus, in Pennsylvania, the
manufacturer's design duty is greater under
ordinary negligence than under strict liability.
This result highlights a long-recognized misnomer: although "strict liability" implies liability without fault, it
actually requires fault
because it requires a
defect in a
manufacturer's prodUnlike th
uct. As discussed

describes the danger as "unreasonable when it
is foreseeable. 7 5 The following sentence
concludes that "therefore" foreseeability
constitutes the appropriate test.7 6 After identifying foreseeability as the operative concept,
the Alabama court reasoned that "[d]uty in this
State remains a function of foreseeability of
the harm tempered by a consideration of the
feasibility of an alternative."77 The court
concluded that manufacturers owe consumers a
duty to make lighters child-resistant because
the court was unwilling to make "the sweeping
and decisive pronouncement that a manufacturer of a product that it intends to be used by
adults never has a duty to make the product
safer by making it child-resistant when the
dangers are foreseeable and prevention of the
danger is reasonable."78
The New York
Supreme Court
reached a similar
r counterparts
result in Campbell v.
below, courts in other
in Indiana v id Tennessee,
BIC Corp.7 9 In
states have employed
Campbell, the court
different theories to
Alabama c
reasoned that "there
reach substantially
is almost no differ111irts have not
similar results.
ence between a
Unlike their counlimited manu! cturers' design
negligence cause of
terparts in Indiana and
duty to ad
action and one
Tennessee, Alabama
purchasers,
sounding in strict
courts have not limited
products liability." 80
manufacturers' design
The court held that
duty to adult purchasNew York law
ers. Alabama courts
imposed a duty
define a "defective" product as one failing to
upon manufacturers when consumers used
meet the "reasonable expectation of an ordiproducts "for an unintended but foreseeable
nary consumer as to its safety."72 Although the use."" The Campbell court appeared to use a
"ordinary consumer" language appears to limit variation of the concept of a foreseeable
the manufacturers' design duty to adults,
misuse. No other New York court has applied
Alabama law defines "unreasonable danger" as this concept to expand the category of users
foreseeable danger which overrides the restric- owed a duty.
tive "ordinary consumer" language.73
These cases suggest a neat dichotomy: a
The reasoning the court used to reach this
manufacturer's duty to design child-resistant
result in Bean is unclear. In one sentence the
lighters usually exists where liability turns on
court refers to "the reasonable expectations of
who is aforeseeable user (Pennsylvania in
an ordinaryconsumer."74 The next sentence
Griggs,Alabama in Bean, and New York in
346 9 Loyola Consumer Law Reporter
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Campbell), but does not ordinarily exist where
liability is based on an intended user (Pennsylvania in Griggs, Indiana in Welch, Tennessee
in Curtis). However, this framework is not
universal. As discussed fully in the following
section, courts in some states refuse to impose
design duty on lighter manufacturers even
when liability is based on foreseeability.
C.

Courts That Refuse to Impose Design
Duty, Even for Foreseeable Users

Conventional negligence theory holds
manufacturers liable for injuries to foreseeable
users of products. Thus, manufacturers owe all
foreseeable users a duty to design reasonably
safe products. This theory greatly expands the
class of potential plaintiffs in product liability
actions because plaintiffs must only be foreseeable, rather than intended, users of the product.
As described above, in Pennsylvania, Alabama,
and New York, manufacturers have been held
liable when they owed a design duty to foreseeable users. However, courts in some states
deviate from this common framework and hold
that manufacturers do not owe a design duty to
all foreseeable users.
For example, Michigan courts have deviated
from the common framework. In Michigan,
product liability law has two branches: implied warranty and negligence. Although in
negligence actions, duty is based on foreseeability, one Michigan appellate court held that
manufacturers owed no duty to design childresistant lighters, even though child fires are
foreseeable.82 In Adams v. PerryFurniture
Co., the parties agreed that children might
foreseeably handle lighters and injure themselves. Nevertheless, the court declined to
impose a design duty on the manufacturer,
explaining: "[w]e are not persuaded that the
risk of this danger imposes a duty upon the
manufacturer of the lighter to make it childresistant in light of the fact that the product is
intended to be sold to adults. '83 Thus, the
Michigan court injected the "intended user"
concept into the foreseeability equation and
1997

limited the duty that manufacturers would
otherwise shoulder under a pure foreseeability
theory.
It is interesting to compare the approaches
of the Michigan and Alabama courts. Michigan
used the intended user concept to override the
foreseeable user theory, thereby limiting the
duty, while Alabama used foreseeability to
expand the scope of the duty that would have
applied under its consumer expectation ("intended user") test.
A subsequent case decided by a different
panel of the Michigan Court of Appeals disagreed with the Adams decision. In
Boumelhem v. BIC Corp., the court criticized
the Adams decision and stressed that Michigan
follows a pure negligence standard requiring a
foreseeability analysis.84 "In a case alleging
defective design, Michigan has adopted a pure
negligence, risk-utility test for determining
whether a defendant has breached its duty of
care in designing a product."85 The court also
rejected the argument that lighters are simple
tools exhibiting obvious danger, which eliminates the design duty.86 The ultimate answer on
Michigan law, however, remains unclear
because its supreme court has declined to
review either the Adams or Boumelhem decisions.
Similarly, a federal district court applying
Missouri law refused to impose a duty to make
a lighter child-resistant, even under a negligence theory. In Sedlock v. BIC Corp., the
United States District Court for the Western
District of Missouri ruled that "Missouri law
explicitly holds that manufacturers are not
liable for failure to make adult products child
proof."87
D.

The Bottom Line: Most States Belong
to One of Three Camps

The cases analyzed above demonstrate that
courts generally fall into one of three camps. In
some states, manufacturers' duty to design
childproof lighters hinges on whether children
are intended users of the product. Courts in
Loyola University Chicago School of Law * 347

these states are reluctant to saddle manufacturers with such a duty. In the opposing camp,
design liability hinges on whether children are
foreseeable users. Courts in these states have
imposed a duty to design childproof lighters on
manufacturers. In the third camp, courts are
unwilling to impose any design duty upon
lighter manufacturers, even under a traditional
negligence theory based on foreseeability.
Consumers should be somewhat unsettled
by this wide range of possible results. Since
the opinions illustrate no clear trend, it is
difficult to predict whether manufacturers will
modify existing lighter design to increase their
products' safety. Currently, lighters are relatively inexpensive, widely available products
which generally perform as designed. However, the substantial damage caused by child
play lighter fires has caused some courts to
reexamine design liability for lighter manufacturers. If courts saddle manufacturers with a
duty to design childproof products, manufacturers may respond by increasing the product's
price or limiting lighters' availability only to
states which refuse to impose such a duty. The
next several years could prove crucial to the
future of the disposable lighter industry. Consumers could experience higher lighter prices
and/or limited availability, depending on the
approach adopted by courts in a given state.
V.

RISK-UTILITY ANALYSIS
BALANCING APPROACH

-

A

The risk-utility analysis underlies the application of both the duty to warn and the design
duty. Regardless of which legal theory a court
applies, the court usually performs the riskutility analysis as an aid in determining a
manufacturer's duty to warn or design duty.88
Generally, courts employ this analysis to weigh
the risk posed by a product against the
product's usefulness. For example, the Griggs
court recognized that "a finding of duty in
negligence [turns] on the last remaining piece
of the traditional duty puzzle: whether the
foreseeable risks were unreasonable."89 In
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Griggs, the Third Circuit utilized the riskutility analysis to conclude that the risk of
harm to children operating lighters was unreasonable. Accordingly, the court held that "the
manufacturer would have a duty to guard
against the unreasonable risk of harm by
designing the lighter to be childproof." 90
In child lighter cases, the key risk factor is
easily identified - the risk of injury from fires
started by small children. In Griggs, for example, the Third Circuit examined statistical
evidence of deaths and injuries caused by such
fires. 91
Unfortunately, most court decisions fail to
identify the appropriate utility factors. For
example, the Griggs court held that two factors
were relevant to the utility prong of the analysis: "the social value of the interest which the
actor is seeking to advance," and "any alternative course open to the actor."92 Applying these
criteria, the court held that "the only interest
[the lighter manufacturer] can be seeking to
advance.., is one of cost and its own economic health." 93 This facile reasoning illustrates the importance of careful consideration
for the utility aspect of the balancing test. By
defining the issue as one of "social utility," and
ignoring everyone except the seller, the Griggs
court rendered the risk-utility analysis meaningless. The court erred by limiting "utility" to
profit. The better approach would look beyond
mere profit and emphasizes a product's utility
to society as a whole, including intended users.
Furthermore, the Griggs analysis ignores the
relative utility of alternate sources of fire. The
proper analysis contemplates the relative value
of alternative sources of fire in weighing the
utility of lighters.
VI.

COMMON SENSE AND
COMMON LAW

This article has described how courts alter
traditional product liability concepts in resolving child play lighter fire cases. Additionally,
this article has identified the trends reflected in
recent child fire cases. In the duty to warn area,
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the cases reflect different analyses yet consisthem child-resistant.
Though the cases do not explicitly compare
tent results, with Alabama being the lone
exception. Though they employ different
lighter fires to fires caused by matches, that
analyses, Indiana, Michigan, and Tennessee
comparison may form an unarticulated basis of
courts, for example, agree that manufacturers
the decisions. A match starts a fire as well as a
owe consumers no duty to warn. The differlighter. Matches are easy to light, and the heat
ences in analysis reflect each state's unique
of a burning match is virtually certain to cause
a child to drop it. Unlike a lighter, a match will
formulation of its own product liability law.
The uniformity of
not go out when
results reflects the
dropped. However,
consensus that lightcases of children
ers are adult products,
Though t]he cases do not
starting fires by
which do not require
playing with matches
warnings to children.
explicitly com are lighter fires
do not generate
This suggests that
litigation against
common sense, or at
to fires caused y matches, that matchbook compaleast a common
nies. Perhaps the
understanding, rather
comparison Imay form an
best explanation for
than a consistent legal
this result is historitheory, drives the
unarticulate I basis of the
cal, not legal. Fires
5
analysis.
resulting from
Similarly, the
deci ions.
matches have ocdesign duty opinions
curred as long as
matches have exdisplay more consistency in result than in
isted, long before
product liability law emerged. On the other
courts' analyses in reaching these results.
hand, inventors developed lighters after prodWhere the text of a state's liability statute
might permit one result, state courts have often uct liability law matured. Therefore, courts are
reached a different result without even address- more willing to view lighters as "products,"
ing the statutory language. For example, an
though lighters perform the same function as
Alabama court seeking to impose liability used matches and consumers operate both by hand.
"foreseeability" to cancel the limitations of its
In several of the cases surveyed, courts seem
statute's "ordinary consumer" language. 94 By
to employ legal analysis not so much to determine the result as to justify it. Several of the
contrast, a Tennessee court declined to impose
courts easily could have reached different
liability although the statute's "anticipatable
results if the courts had applied theory more
handling" language suggested it could do so.95
rigidly. Instead, the typical analysis tends to
Though the courts have used a broad range of
reasoning to come to their conclusions, their
spring from a strong sense of the underlying
factual and social realities of childhood hazholdings have been consistent.
A broad consistency in result emerges. The
ards. Although courts seldom articulate this
opinions extensively discuss both the policy
rationale, it is a powerful force driving the
underlying manufacturers' duty to make
outcome of a majority of cases and explains
lighters child-resistant, and the factual reality
the courts' general reluctance to impose either
underlying the policy. With the exception of
a duty to warn or a duty to design childproof
Alabama, 96 and a non-controlling Michigan
lighters on manufacturers. As child lighter fire
case, 97 courts have declined to impose a duty to litigation multiplies, courts may be forced to
make non-defective products safer by making
reevaluate their positions.
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